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NEVER LET A GOOD CRISIS LEAD YOU 
ASTRAY: THE LESSONS OF CHRISTIAN 
REALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY 
RICHARD M. ESENBERG 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of Christian Realism associated with Reinhold Niebuhr 
might be generally defined as 
a reminder of our limits and an affirmation of our hope. It tells us 
that our knowledge is imperfect, our plans are incomplete, and our 
expectations are inevitably distorted by self-interest. We are always 
trying to overcome these limitations, and we are often partly 
successful; but our partial successes make it all the more important 
to remember that the limits remain, mocking our confidence with 
ironic reversals and threatening our pride with forces beyond our 
control. Final answers and permanent solutions elude us.1 
Although there are certainly concepts in Catholic Social Thought that 
seem to share much with the ideas associated with Christian Realism, it is 
my purpose here to treat Christian Realism as a distinct—or at least 
separate—set of perspectives on law and public policy and to explore how 
it might interact with the insights of Catholic social teaching. In particular, I 
want to consider how Christian Realism might be informed by—and how it 
might inform—the Catholic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.  
Subsidiarity is most often defined as  
that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or 
changed . . . [that j]ust as it is gravely wrong to take from 
individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and 
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and 
at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to 
 
 1. ROBIN W. LOVIN, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND THE NEW REALITIES 1 (2008). 
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assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organizations can do.2 
Solidarity, on the other hand, 
is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the 
misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, 
it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the 
common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each 
individual, because we are all really responsible for all.3  
There is a real friction in integrating subsidiarity and solidarity.  This 
difficulty reflects, in my view, a creative tension serving an underlying 
unity.  The two are often criticized as conflicting generalities—the latter 
calling for greater social cohesiveness and collective effort and the former 
supporting greater social decentralization and private autonomy.4 
While subsidiarity indeed emphasizes the freedom and responsibility of 
individuals, voluntary associations, and units of local government, 
subsidiarity is not, as is sometimes claimed, a merely “instrumental” or 
“jurisdictional” principle.5 Subsidiarity is, to the contrary, a moral judgment 
about human empowerment. It suggests that public policy ought to be 
evaluated in terms of its empowerment of individuals and the voluntary and 
mediating associations into which they gather.6 Solidarity, on the other 
hand, is the objective toward which these persons and associations—freed 
by subsidiarity—are to strive.7 It is not so much a restriction on subsidiarity 
 
 2. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno ¶ 79 (May 15, 1931), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_ 
quadragesimo-anno_en.html. 
 3. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis ¶ 38 (Dec. 30, 1987), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_ 
sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html. 
 4. In the context of the adoption of subsidiarity as a constitutive principle of the European 
Union, one commentator noted that subsidiarity might be called “an empty shell devoid of 
concrete substance . . . a golden rule, a fashionable term, a concept with which anyone might 
agree in principle, because all can define for themselves what it means in any specific case.” Paul 
D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616, 
628 (1994). 
 5. See, e.g., Jerome M. Organ, Subsidiarity and Solidarity: Lenses for Assessing the 
Appropriate Locus for Environmental Regulation and Enforcement, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 262, 
264 (2008) (“[T]he principle of subsidiarity is not so much a foundational principle of Catholic 
Social Thought on its own as it is an instrumental principle designed to promote one of the 
foundational principles of Catholic Social Thought: the common good.”). I certainly agree that the 
point of subsidiarity is to serve the common good and to help “members of the body social,” i.e., 
subsidiarity cannot be seen as a religiously-sanctioned libertarianism in which individual 
autonomy is the ultimate good. But I do believe that it reflects a judgment about human nature 
such that the measure of subsidiarity is not simply whether it “works.” See infra pp. 388–90. 
 6. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond 
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001). To be sure, Professor Vischer and I, while agreeing on 
the broader implications of subsidiarity, may well disagree on the particulars of those 
implications. See infra pp. 400. 
 7. See infra  pp. 373. 
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but a principle guiding the individuals and the various orders of society.8 
It is my further suggestion that the perspectives offered by Christian 
Realism can provide further guidance as to the resolution of this creative 
attention and application of these principles. It too might be dismissed as a 
vague counsel against, on the one hand, undue optimism and ambition 
while warning against, on the other, unwarranted pessimism and 
passivity—an admonition against being too hot or too cold.9  But its counsel 
of humility and care can tell us something about the limits of ambition and 
remind us to see the world as it is and not how we want it to be. It reminds 
us that empiricism is not simply an annoying distraction interfering with the 
assertion of moral or ideological principles. What we wish for needs to be 
reconciled with what can be done. 
This is not to say that Catholic Social Thought—or Christian Realism—
will resolve our policy disputes. Just as subsidiarity does not compel us to 
be Republicans, solidarity does not mean that God wants us to be 
Democrats. In the great encyclicals on social theory, the Popes have made it 
clear that the Church has no models to propose.10 While I believe that the 
use of these concepts can clarify—and perhaps even reduce—our 
ideological differences, it would be unrealistic—in both the Niebuhrian and 
everyday sense of the word—to believe that they can eliminate them. 
 
 8. See, e.g., Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate ¶ 58 (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_ 
20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html  (“The principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked 
to the principle of solidarity and vice versa, since the former without the latter gives way to social 
privatism, while the latter, without the former gives way to paternalist social assistance that is 
demeaning to those in need.”); Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus ¶ 15 (May 1, 1991), 
available at  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_ 
01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html (“The State must contribute to the achievement of these 
goals both directly and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity, by 
creating favourable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to 
abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the 
principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing certain limits on the autonomy of the 
parties who determine working conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum 
support for the unemployed worker.”) 
 9. One Niebuhr biographer characterized him as someone who “always confounded those 
who stressed one side of his career or one segment of his standpoint at the expense of another.” 
RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY 294 (1985).Without fail, Fox 
continues, “[h]e confused his comrades as often as his detractors.” Id. Another commentator, 
commenting on President Obama’s professed admiration for Niebuhr, see infra  pp. 394, writes 
that Niebuhr was “at various times a patriotic war supporter, a pacifist, an interventionist, a liberal, 
a socialist, a Christian realist, a pessimist, an optimist, what Robert McAfee Brown has called a 
‘pessimistic optimist,’ etc. It is not feasible to hold Obama or anyone else to a Niebuhrian 
standard because we cannot know what that standard might be.” Liam Julien, Niebuhr and 
Obama, POL’Y REV., Apr.–May 2009, at 19, 31. 
 10. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 9 (“The Church does not have 
technical solutions to offer . . . .”); Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 43 (“The 
Church has no models to present . . . .”); Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 
41 (“[T]he Church does not propose economic or political systems . . . .”). 
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It is my contention that these theological concepts offer something, if 
not perspectives.  Solidarity (as well as the underlying ontology of Catholic 
Social Thought) suggests that we evaluate public policy by its service of the 
common good as opposed to whether it can command the assent of a 
majority of differing interests. It rejects agnosticism about the nature of the 
good.11  Solidarity suggests that legal and political discourse ought not to 
dismiss the notion that there is a common good as opposed to mere 
conflicting interests that ought to be mediated.  Subsidiarity, however, 
suggests that this common good requires not only the immediate 
satisfaction of material wants, but the empowerment of individuals, 
voluntary associations, and units of local government. Because human 
beings are creative agents, the status quo is never to be taken as a given. 
Over the top of this counterpoised unity, realism reminds us that we must 
always be concerned not only with what law and policy causes to happen, 
but what they may prevent from happening. It cautions skepticism 
regarding efforts to impose some centralized view of the common good and 
modesty about what human effort can accomplish.12 
In this paper, I propose to use, as a starting point, what many perceive 
to be a shift toward state intervention and centralized decision-making 
under the Obama administration as well as its reassertion of classical 
Progressive Era faith in rational administration. 
II. TOP DOWN SOLUTIONS: THE QUEST FOR PERFECTION AS THE 
ENEMY OF THE GOOD 
According to journalist Michael Kinsley, “a gaffe is when a politician 
tells the truth.”13 President Obama’s chief of staff, Rahm Emmanuel, almost 
certainly gaffed when he said, in relation to the financial meltdown that 
rocked the nation in the fall of 2008, “You don’t ever want a crisis to go to 
waste . . . .”14 In Emmanuel’s view, a crisis presents “an opportunity to do 
important things that you would otherwise avoid . . . .”15 And so it does—
even if candid recognition of the fact breeds discomfort.16 
 
 11. See generally John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social 
Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513 (2009). 
 12. Cf. Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments In the United States, 52 
VILL. L. REV. 67, 81, 109 (2007) (arguing that subsidiarity is “anti-perfectionistic” and 
“substantively modest”). 
 13. Michael Kinsley, The Ghost of Columns Past, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 14, 1992, 
at 19. 
 14. Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama, Assembling Team, Turns to the Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/politics/07obama.html.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Emmanuel’s comment has brought a torrent of criticism. See, e.g., Amity Shlaes, Rahm 
Emanuel’s Crisis Breeds Health-Care Trouble, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 21, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aqNQLSKwZKAM (“Rash actions 
lead to reckless policies. That was a big takeaway of the economic crisis.”); Jonah Goldberg, 
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But just as hard cases can make bad law,17 crisis can lead to panic and 
panic to poor judgment. Andrew Gelman has written that when a simple 
system such as politics seeks to regulate a complex system such as society, 
unintended consequences follow.18 More than one American politician has 
remarked in some way on the supposed Chinese wisdom that a crisis is “an 
opportunity riding the dangerous wind.”19 The danger is as real as the 
 
Obama’s Fear Mongering, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 11, 2009, http://article.nationalreview.com/ 
388089/obamas-fear-mongering/jonah-goldberg  (“Scaring people about X in order to achieve Y 
is fundamentally undemocratic.”); Charles Krauthammer, The Great Non Sequitur, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/05/ 
AR2009030502951.html (“The markets’ recent precipitous decline is a reaction not just to the 
absence of any plausible bank rescue plan, but also to the suspicion that Obama sees the 
continuing financial crisis as usefully creating the psychological conditions—the sense of crisis 
bordering on fear-itself panic—for enacting his “Big Bang” agenda to federalize and/or socialize 
health care, education and energy, the commanding heights of post-industrial society. Clever 
politics, but intellectually dishonest to the core.”); David Boaz, Obama’s Shock Doctrine, THE 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/feb/10/ 
obama-klein-shock-doctrine (“It’s all out of the ‘shock doctrine’ playbook: scare people to death 
and then demand that your agenda be enacted without delay.”); Patterico’s Pontifications, Rahm 
Emanuel: Never Allow a Crisis to Go to Waste, (Nov. 13, 2008), http://patterico.com/2008/11/13/ 
rahm-emanuel-never-allow-a-crisis-to-go-to-waste/ (“Is Obama’s goal to fix the crisis—or to use 
it to accomplish other things that he wanted to accomplish anyway?”).  
 17. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.”). 
 18. James Quinn, The Law of Unintended Consequences: 20th Century and Beyond, 
SEEKING ALPHA, Jan. 5, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/113162-the-law-of-unintended-
consequences-20th-century-and-beyond (quoting Andrew Gelman) (“The political system is 
simple. It operates with limited information (rational ignorance), short time horizons, low 
feedback, and poor and misaligned incentives. Society in contrast is a complex, evolving, high-
feedback, incentive-driven system. When a simple system tries to regulate a complex system you 
often get unintended consequences.”) . 
 19. Thinkexist.com, Chinese Proverbs Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/a_crisis_ 
is_an_opportunity_riding_the_dangerous/182149.html (last visited April 21, 2010). Indeed, at 
least two Presidents have argued that the proposition is embedded in the language itself. See, e.g., 
John F. Kennedy, Remarks at the Convocation of the United Negro College Fund, Indianapolis, 
Indiana, Apr. 12, 1959, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/ 
Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+Pre-Pres/189POWERS09JFKPOWEES_59APR12.htm (last 
visited April 21, 2010) (“When written in Chinese, the word “crisis” is composed of two 
characters—one represents danger, and one represents opportunity.”); Thinkexist.com, Richard M. 
Nixon Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/the_chinese_use_two_brush_strokes_to_write_ 
the/6945.html (last visited April 21, 2010) (“The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word 
‘crisis.’ One brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the 
danger - but recognize the opportunity.”). The ideographic claim is long- standing, see Frank 
Gannon, The Future Lies Ahead, The New Nixon (Aug. 4, 2009), 
http://thenewnixon.org/2009/08/04/the-future-lies-ahead/ (referring to the “now tired old chestnut 
about the Chinese character that means both ‘crisis’ and ‘opportunity’”), and has even been 
repeated on The Simpsons, The Simpsons: Fear of Flying (FOX television broadcast Dec. 18, 
1994) (transcript available at http://snpp.com/episodes/2F08.html)  (“Lisa: Look on the bright 
side, Dad. Did you know that the Chinese use the same word for ‘crisis’ as they do for 
‘opportunity’? Homer: Yes! Cris-atunity.”). The “same word” claim is apparently based on the 
Mandarin character wēijī  (危), but appears to be inaccurate. Victor Muir, Danger + Opportunity ≠ 
Crisis, Pinyin.Info: A Guide to the Writing of Mandarin Chinese in Romanticization, 
http://pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html (last visited on Apr. 21, 2010). I trust that the larger point 
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opportunity. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the causes of our recent 
financial difficulties. I suspect that they are varied and not consistent with 
the ideological presuppositions of the right or the left.20 It is clear, however, 
that one popular diagnosis revolves around the idea that markets are in need 
of greater regulation and direction.21 On this view, the decentralized 
decisions of participants in the financial marketplace are unlikely—or at 
least not guaranteed—to reach a desirable equilibrium. Rather than expect 
optimal outcomes to percolate from the bottom up, it may be necessary for 
the state to impose—or at least to delimit—outcomes from the top down.22 
A. CENTRALIZING POLICY INITIATIVES 
In the wake of the financial crisis, the outgoing Bush and new Obama 
administrations proposed or enacted a number of bold policy initiatives. 
Some are in response to and intended to provide relief from the downturn.23 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, passed in the waning 
days of the Bush administration, committed $700 billion to purchase or 
insure troubled financial assets and instruments. Major provisions of the 
legislation provided the purchase of devalued or “toxic” assets from the 
financial institutions holding them, thereby cleaning up their balance sheets 
and, it was hoped, stimulating additional lending.24 
This aspect of the Act, the program commonly referred to as “TARP,” 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program, was expanded to involve the injection 
of equity into large financial institutions in return for preferred stock or 
 
remains valid. 
 20. See, e.g., Jeffrey Friedman, A Crisis of Politics, Not Economics: Complexity, Ignorance 
and Policy Failure, 21 CRITICAL REV. 127 (2009) (arguing that complex and interacting 
regulations fostered the concentration of excessive risk); Amar Bhidé, An Accident Waiting to 
Happen, 21 CRITICAL REV. 211 (2009) (blaming under-regulation of banking and overregulation 
of securities).  
 21. See, e.g., ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: RETURN OF THE MASTER (2009); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM (2009); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE 
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010). 
 22. Although I often refer to state regulation as directed from “the top” and market outcomes 
as emerging “from the bottom,” these terms may be less descriptive when markets are highly 
concentrated or where participants engage in collusion. I express no judgment about whether these 
conditions characterize the financial or any other particular market in the United States or 
elsewhere. But in principle, subsidiarity may also suggest devolution from larger to smaller 
private institutions, although I think application of the concept in such a context is even more 
complex and well beyond the scope of this paper. As we will see, subsidiarity might certainly be 
consistent with the need for state facilitation of human agency that would not be adequately 
supported through private arrangements. 
 23. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008). 
 24. For a good description of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), see Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, http://troubled-asset-relief-program.net/ (last visited on Apr. 21, 2010). 
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senior debt instruments.25 Participating institutions, at least some of whom 
initially resisted participation,26 have been subject to compensation 
restrictions.27 In December 2008, an executive order further expanded the 
TARP program to allow its funds to be spent on any program deemed 
necessary by the President to avert financial crisis.28 
This led to the use of additional government funds to bail out Chrysler 
and General Motors, with $17.4 billion in TARP funds eventually loaned to 
the automakers.29 That led, with stunning speed, to the acquisition of 
General Motors by the federal government.30 It led to a government 
sponsored—and financed—reorganization of Chrysler, resulting in a 
transfer of a majority stake to the United Auto Workers union with the 
federal government retaining a minority interest.31  
In the early weeks of the new administration, a stimulus bill called for 
almost a trillion dollars in new spending.32 In combination with the recently 
enacted TARP program, these initiatives, if fully implemented, would have 
been roughly half the size of the proposed federal budget for 2008. The 
President’s 2011 budget proposal called for over a trillion dollars in 
increased taxes over ten years.33 In just three years, the proposed federal 
budget has increased by almost one-third.34 The prospect of substantial 
federal control of such iconic corporations raised concerns among many 
about the expanding role of the federal government.  
Other initiatives, while certainly claimed to contribute to financial 
prosperity, may be better understood as “opportunities” presented by a 
“good crisis.” The administration’s proposed cap and trade legislation 
would effectively determine carbon emission levels across much of the 
economy and establish the conditions for allocating permission for such 
 
 25. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a $250 Billion Banking Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Jon D. McKinnon & John D. Stoll, U.S. Throws Lifeline to Detroit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122969367595121563.html. The Bush administration 
turned to TARP funds after a bill authorizing funds for that purpose failed to pass the Senate. 
27 Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html. 
 31. Michael J. de la Merced & Micheline Maynard, Fiat Deal With Chrysler Seals Swift 42-
Day Overhaul, N.Y.TIMES, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/global/ 
11chrysler.html. 
 32. Getting to $787 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/STIMULUS_FINAL_0217.html. 
 33. CCH GROUP, CCH TAX BRIEFING: FY 2011 FEDERAL BUDGET—TAX PROPOSALS, Feb. 
5, 2010, available at http://tax.cchgroup.com/legislation/2011-federal-budget.pdf. 
 34. Id. The proposed budget for fiscal year 2011 is $3.8 trillion. The proposed budget for 
fiscal year 2008 was approximately $2.9 trillion. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV’T, FISCAL YEAR 2008, available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/budget/tables.pdf.  
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emissions.35 It would impose new taxes of up to $200 billion per year.36 The 
bill would declare—by fiat—that emissions must be reduced by 83 percent 
by the year 2050, a level not seen since the turn of the twentieth century. 
Those businesses unable to reduce emissions would have to purchase 
emission permits from those who no longer (if they ever did) need them—
assuming such available permits exist. Failing the availability of permits, 
such businesses could purchase offsets for ameliorating activities—the 
nature and value of which would presumably be determined by 
administrative fiat. 
Although the idea of permitting private companies to trade emission 
permits is a nod to decentralization, the idea of a centrally determined 
emission level (as opposed to, say, a carbon tax designed to internalize the 
cost of emissions) represents a significant increase in centralized 
management of economic life. Even as it became clear that a cap and trade 
bill, having passed in the House, might not be approved by the Senate, the 
administration announced that the Environmental Protection Agency would 
begin to regulate carbon emissions.37   
Although cap and trade legislation may never be passed and equivalent 
regulation may never be imposed, the administration has, as this article was 
going to press, passed a health care bill of such a scope that its proponents 
regard it as “historic” and its opponents call it “catastrophic.” I think it is 
fair to say that the bill substantially overhauls the delivery of health care in 
the United States. It requires employers to provide—and individuals to 
purchase—health insurance plans meeting federally mandated criteria,38 
including a centralized determination of cost effectiveness. The new law 
imposes substantial obligations on states both in terms of Medicaid 
expansion and with respect to the establishment of insurance exchanges. 
Although certainly an exaggeration, Newsweek magazine hinted at the 
magnitude of several months change in proclaiming that “we are all 
socialists now.”39 Although I don’t believe that the President can properly 
 
 35. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, THE 
AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (H.R. 2454), July 2009, available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf (the full text 
of the statute is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
cong_bills&docid=f:h2454pcs.txt.pdf). 
 36. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ANALYSIS OF CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM, available at 
www.openmarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/foia-release.pdf (last visited April 21, 2010) 
(produced pursuant to Freedom of Information Act request by letter dated Sept. 18, 2009, from 
Jennifer Beasley to Christopher Horner). 
 37. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Moves to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/science/earth/01epa.html. 
 38. For a summary of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, see THE HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM – SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH 
REFORM LAW (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf. 
 39. Jon Meachem & Evan Thomas, We Are All Socialists Now, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2009, 
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be called a “socialist,” it certainly seems that the Age of Reagan has ended 
and counterrevolution is in the air. 
B. A NEW PROGRESSIVE ERA? 
Each of these initiatives seems to involve substantial increases in the 
authority and role of the federal government. Each seems to involve a 
substantial increase in the centralization of decision-making and in the 
determination of standards and constraints governing decision-making. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore and pass judgment on any of 
them (some of which remain only tentatively defined and subject to 
change), nor do I wish to argue that any particular program “violates” the 
tenets of subsidiarity. 
In the inaugural issue of the journal National Affairs, the Hudson 
Institute’s William Schambra argues that Barack Obama is a “policy” rather 
than a “program” President.40 Schambra explains that this approach, first 
identified by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, argues that: 
[G]overning means not just addressing discrete challenges as they 
arise, but formulating comprehensive policies aimed at giving large 
social systems—and indeed society itself—more rational and 
coherent forms and functions. In this view, the long-term, systemic 
problems of health care, education, and the environment cannot be 
solved in small pieces. They must be taken on in whole, lest the 
unattended elements react against and undo the carefully 
orchestrated policy measures.41 
As Moynihan put it, “everything relates to everything,” and, therefore, 
“there are no social interests about which the national government does not 
have some policy or other.”42  
The need for comprehensive solutions has led proponents of this 
approach to chafe at our constitutional structure of limited government and 
divided power. Progressive reformers throughout the twentieth century, 
including most notably Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, came, in 
Schambra’s words, “to denigrate the wisdom and relevance of the American 
Constitution, which frustrated centralization and coordination by dispersing 
governing power across the states and over the branches of government.”43 
Wilson famously wrote:  
Government is not a machine; but a living thing. It falls, not under 
 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/183663 (“As boomers age and spending grows, we will become 
even more French.”). 
 40. William Schambra, Obama and the Policy Approach, 1 NAT’L AFF. 127 (2009), 
available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/obama-and-the-policy-approach. 
 41. Id. at 127–28. 
 42. Id. at 128. 
 43. Id. at 130. 
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the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is 
accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its 
environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions by 
the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs offset 
against each other, as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is 
dependent upon their quick co-operation, their ready response to the 
commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of 
purpose . . . . There can be no successful government without the 
intimate, instinctive co-ordination of the organs of life and 
action. . . . Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in 
structure and in practice. All that progressives ask or desire is 
permission—in an era when “development,” “evolution,” is the 
scientific word—to interpret the Constitution according to [the] 
Darwinian principle.44 
In this view, the challenges of public policy are about applying the right 
type of expertise. Schambra cites Progressive reformer Herbert Croly who 
wrote that a “better future would derive from the beneficent activities of 
expert social engineers who would bring to the service of social ideals all 
the technical resources which research could discover and ingenuity could 
devise.”45  
The “policy” or “classical progressive” approach tends to despair of the 
messiness of the political process and the stumbling blocks it places in the 
way of reform driven by professional expertise. Franklin Roosevelt, for 
example, called for a “re-appraisal of values” in which property rights must 
be supplanted “by the day of enlightened administration . . . .”46 Thus, as 
Paul Rahe has explained, progressives have sought the expansion of the 
administrating state and the progressive impulse has been to respond to 
crises “genuine and imaginary, and exploit these opportunities by 
strengthening and extending the scope of the central administration in 
something akin to the fashion that the old progressives had once advised. 
From war, depression, and other crises, real or imagined, the administrative 
state has drawn strength.”47 
Placing this in our contemporary context, Schambra writes: 
Obama insists, we must come up with comprehensive policies that 
account for the entire sweep of interconnected social and economic 
factors contributing to the problem, and whose coordination will 
contribute to its solution. Echoing Moynihan’s understanding of the 
 
 44. PAUL A. RAHE, SOFT DESPOTISM, DEMOCRACY’S DRIFT: MONTESQUIEU, ROUSSEAU, 
TOCQUEVILLE, AND THE MODERN PROSPECT 249 (2009) (quoting WOODROW WILSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908)). 
 45. Schambra, supra note 40, at 130. 
 46. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, Commonwealth Club Address, in FRANKLIN DELANO 
ROOSEVELT, 1882–1945, at 99–107 (Howard F. Bremer ed., 1971). 
 47. RAHE, supra note 44, at 256. 
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implications of the policy approach, Obama suggests that tackling 
only isolated pieces of the problem, or trying to solve only one 
problem at a time, will merely introduce further distortions into 
what should be treated as a unified and coordinated system. A 
comprehensive policy approach will enable us to take maximum 
advantage of natural- and social-science expertise, displacing 
expensive or ineffective local practices by spreading system-wide 
those programs that have proven to be more effective and less 
expensive, as documented by thorough research and 
experimentation.48 
In the President’s view, “selfishness or ideological rigidity has led us to 
look at the problem in isolated pieces rather than as an all-encompassing 
system; we must put aside parochialism to take the long systemic view” and 
must “formulate a uniform national policy supported by empirical and 
objective data rather than shallow, insular opinion . . . .”49 Thus, in his New 
Foundations speech delivered at Georgetown University, President Obama 
argues that the pillar of economic prosperity is composed of interacting and 
interconnected federal policy in the areas of education, health care, the 
environment, financial regulation, and fiscal policy.50 The President has 
consistently derided political and ideological differences as “false 
choices”51 and has consistently committed the specifics of reform—the 
precise nature of a cap and trade system, the specifics of “bending” the 
health care cost curve, the manner in which the structural deficit is to be 
addressed—to subsequent administrative determination.52 
 
 48. Schambra, supra note 40, at 135. 
 49. Id. at 136–37. 
 50. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Address at Georgetown 
University: A New Foundation for the Economy (Apr. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/04/14/a_new_foundation_for_the_economy_ 
obama_48911.html. 
 51. Christopher Beam, The Fallacy of False Choices: Why Obama’s Favorite Rhetorical Tic 
Can Be Misleading, SLATE, Dec. 10, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2238074/ (collective 
examples) (rejecting “stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests [and] an endless 
campaign to impose our values around the world . . . .”) (“[W]e reject as false the choice between 
our safety and our ideals.”) (rejecting the idea that we must “choose between paying down our 
deficits on the one hand, and investing in job creation and economic growth on the other. This is a 
false choice”) (“[Obama] reject[s] the false choice between securing this nation and wasting 
billions of taxpayer dollars . . . .”) (“[W]e need not choose between a chaotic and unforgiving 
capitalism and an oppressive government-run economy . . . .”) (“Our government has forced what 
[Obama] believe[s] is a false choice between sound science and moral values . . . .”) (“There’s 
been a tension between those who have sought to conserve our natural resources for the benefit of 
future generations, and those who have sought to profit from these resources. But [Obama is] here 
to tell you this is a false choice.”).  
 52. Charles R. Kesler, The Tea Party Spirit, 10 CLAREMONT REV. OF BOOKS 1, 3 (2010) 
(noting that the health care reform bill contains “scores of places where power is delegated to 
administrative agencies and special boards, which are charged to fill the gaps in the written 
legislation by promulgating thousands, if not tens of thousands, of new pages of regulations that 
will then be applied to individual cases”). 
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III. THE YIN AND YANG: SUBSIDIARITY AND SOLIDARITY 
A. SUBSIDIARITY: THE VALUE OF DECENTRALIZATION 
The idea of subsidiarity has a long pedigree in Catholic social teaching. 
First hinted at by Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum Novarum,53 it was 
expressly set forth by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno: 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave 
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For 
every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the 
members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.54 
In this, Pius XI echoed Leo XIII’s admonition that “the State must not 
absorb the individual or the family”55 and “the law must not undertake 
more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the 
removal of the mischief . . .”56 that lead to the need for intervention.  
The idea has been repeated in subsequent encyclicals and is a well 
accepted principle of the Church’s social teaching. Pope John XXIII wrote 
of the importance of “the founding of a great many such intermediate 
groups”57 and Paul VI warned that “[r]ulers must be careful not to hamper 
the development of family, social or cultural groups nor that of intermediate 
bodies or organizations . . . .”58 As noted above, Pope John Paul II 
emphasized the importance of the concept in Centesimus Annus, explaining 
that “the social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, but is 
realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and 
including economic, social, political and cultural groups, which stem from 
human nature itself and have their own autonomy.”59  The Compendium of 
the Social Doctrine of the Church calls subsidiarity “one of the most 
constant and characteristic directives of the Church’s social doctrine . . . 
present since the first great social encyclical.”60 Most recently, Pope 
 
 53. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum ¶¶ 13–14 (May 15, 1891), available at http://www. 
vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_ 
en.html. 
 54. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 2, ¶ 79. 
 55. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 53, ¶ 35. 
 56. Id. ¶ 36. 
 57. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris ¶ 24 (Apr. 11, 1963), available at http://www. 
vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en. 
html. 
 58. Pope Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World—Gaudium et 
Spes ¶ 75 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_ 
council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. 
 59. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 13. 
 60. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
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Benedict XVI called subsidiarity “an expression of inalienable human 
freedom,”61 and “the most effective antidote against any form of all-
encompassing welfare state.”62 
It is important to note, as Pius XI and his successors insisted, that 
subsidiarity applies not only to create a presumption in favor of the freedom 
of individuals, but also to “lesser” or “smaller” associations into which 
individuals may organize themselves. As the Compendium puts it:  
It is impossible to promote the dignity of the person without 
showing concern for the family, groups, associations, local 
territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, 
cultural, sports-oriented, recreational, professional and political 
expressions to which people spontaneously give life and which 
make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth.63 
Richard John Neuhaus and Peter Berger have called those voluntary 
associations standing between men and women and the mega-structures of 
society “intermediary institutions” and argued that they serve as antidotes to 
the alienation associated with larger institutions.64 In their view, large 
mega-structures, including but not limited to the state, fail to provide 
“meaning and identity for individual existence.”65 Recognition of the value 
such “mediating” institutions is not limited to subsidiarity. The Calvinist 
notion of sphere sovereignty claims that there are social spheres — the 
state, the church, the family, for example —that are autonomous in their 
areas of responsibility.66 Tocqueville regarded “associationalism”—the 
existence of robust voluntary associations—as among the signal strengths 
of American democracy.67 These institutions stand between the individual 
and large institutions such as the state and that fact is seen as both 
protecting and empowering the individual.  
The notion is that support for a free market and decentralized 
government is epistemic—i.e., based on the idea that “[w]e cannot know 
enough to produce the outcomes we desire by forethought and deliberations 
 
Church ¶ 81 (2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/ 
justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html [hereinafter 
Compendium]. 
 61. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 57. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 185. 
 64. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF 
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977). 
 65. Id. 
 66. ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 90 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1970) 
(1931). 
 67. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 123 (Henry Reeve trans., 
Arlington House 1966) (1835) ("[America] is the only [country] in the world where the continual 
exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life, and where all the advantages 
which civilization can confer are procured by means of it."). 
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without doing more harm than good.”68 Centralized decision- makers 
cannot possibly know enough to direct activities with which they are not 
directly involved; in complex and diverse societies, dispersing authority 
among a variety of public and private actors is more likely to result in good 
decisions.  
There is, as will be explored in more detail later, subsidiarity offers 
more than merely instrumental value. There is also a sense of 
empowerment, not simply to serve the autonomy of the individuals whose 
liberty is unimpeded, but to allow each to participate in the definition and 
advancement of the common good. John McGinnis, for example, sees 
intermediary institutions as generators of alternative values. That these 
values might generate a spontaneous order—or what Friedrich Hayek called 
catallaxy69—is one of the posited values of free markets. There is certainly 
support, if not unqualified endorsement, for this idea in the social 
encyclicals. It is part of the value of subsidiarity, although, as we will see, 
not its full measure.70 
This may certainly have “jurisdictional” or even “conservative” 
implications. John Courtney Murray wrote: 
Rerum novarum, adhering to the Western Christian political 
tradition, makes it clear that government, strictly speaking, creates 
nothing; that its function is to order, not to create. Perhaps more 
exactly, its function is to create the conditions of order under which 
original vitalities and forces, present in society, may have full scope 
to create the values by which society lives. Perhaps still more 
exactly, the only value which government per se is called upon to 
create is the value of order. But the value of order resides primarily 
in the fact that it furnishes opportunitates, facilitates . . . for the 
exercise of the freedoms which are the rightful prerogative of other 
social magnitudes and forces. These freedoms, rightly ordered, are 
the true creative sources of all manner of social values.71  
It is quite common, in the American context, for conservatives (or those 
offering a “conservative” critique of centralized economic regulation) to 
criticize such strategies as inconsistent with subsidiarity found in Catholic 
 
 68. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 256 n.8 
(1993).  
 69. Hayek used the term to “describe the order brought about by the mutual adjustment of 
many individual economies in a market.” FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
107–09 (1976) (forming the word from the Greek verb “katallattein . . . which meant, 
significantly, not only ‘to exchange’ but also ‘to admit into the community’ and ‘to change from 
enemy into friend.’”). While hardly endorsing an untrammeled free market, the social encyclicals 
recognize that profit may be a way of knowing that needs have been fulfilled. Pope John Paul II, 
Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 35. 
 70. See infra pp. 387–90. 
 71. John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion, in 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 49, 78 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1993).  
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Social Thought72based almost entirely on what are seen to be subsidiarity’s 
claims. While I may welcome this observation from my brothers and sisters 
on the right, I cannot end with it.  
As a merely jurisdictional principle, subsidiarity is highly indefinite. 
While it “inculcates a steady bias toward decentralization, freedom, and 
initiative,”73 subsidiarity also admits of the need for higher authorities to 
assist lower ones. This aspect has been said to justify much in the way of 
state intervention, and, even, in some encyclicals, to call for stronger 
structures of global governance and authority.74  Even in Centesimus Annus, 
arguably the most “pro-market” of the Church’s social encyclicals, Pope 
John Paul II wrote:  
Economic activity, especially the activity of a market economy, 
cannot be conducted in an institutional, juridical or political 
vacuum. On the contrary, it presupposes sure guarantees of 
individual freedom and private property, as well as a stable 
currency and efficient public services. Hence the principle task of 
the State is to guarantee this security, so that those who work and 
produce can enjoy the fruits of their labours and thus feel 
encouraged to work efficiently and honestly. The absence of 
stability, together with the corruption of public officials and the 
spread of improper sources of growing rich and of easy profits 
deriving from illegal or purely speculative activities, constitutes one 
of the chief obstacles to development and to the economic order.75 
The state, it seems, may have a “duty to sustain business activities by 
creating conditions which will ensure job opportunities, by stimulating 
those activities where they are lacking or by supporting them in moments of 
crisis.”76 While it is “wrong to assign a larger and higher organization 
functions that smaller and lower bodies can perform sufficiently well,”77 
subsidiarity does not tell us what those functions are.   
Catholic Social Thought tends to view the state, its elements, and 
private institutions as an organic whole, rather than as Madison’s competing 
factions. Thus, while the state may not do what the individuals or the lower 
orders can do for themselves or are within their sphere of responsibility, 
there are things that only the state can do78 and there are circumstances in 
 
 72. See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 6, at 104 (collecting examples); Robert A. Sirico, 
Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and Application, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549 (1997). 
 73. Francis Canavan, The Popes and the Economy, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 429, 437 (1997). 
 74. See, e.g., Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 67. 
 75. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 48. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 2, at ¶ 79. 
 78. Id. ¶ 80 ("Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those 
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which the state may facilitate—or remove obstacles to—the work of lower 
orders. 
B. SOLIDARITY: THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY 
The matter is further complicated by the emphasis of Catholic Social 
Teaching on solidarity, that is, the idea that social justice requires regard for 
the well-being of all persons. Catholic Social Teaching has long 
emphasized the universal destination of goods.79 Thus Pope John Paul II 
wrote that while subsidiarity might suggest the importance of “the free 
exercise of economic activity,” solidarity calls upon the state to defend the 
weakest.80 Solidarity is often treated as a virtue, something that ought to 
inform and guide decision making by various decision makers. It is, for 
example, a duty of private as well as public bodies.81  
But the Church’s social encyclicals are replete with references to the 
need for state intervention in economic matters in the interest of “social 
justice” and to the need for higher authorities to intervene in order to 
“facilitate” the ability of lower orders to fulfill their intended purposes. 
Although this requirement is not properly understood as a warrant for 
radical equality82 or socialism,83 it may certainly provide support for state 
intervention in support of the economically disadvantaged: 
The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both 
directly and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of 
subsidiarity, by creating favourable conditions for the free exercise 
of economic activity, which will lead to abundant opportunities for 
employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the 
principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing certain 
limits on the autonomy of the parties who determine working 
conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum 
support for the unemployed worker.84 
Insistence upon “social justice” and a “preferential option for the 
 
things that belong to it alone because it alone can do them"). 
 79. Pope Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World—Gaudium et 
Spes, supra note 59, ¶ 69 ("God destined the earth and all it contains for all men and all peoples so 
that all created things around be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice 
tempered by charity."). See generally Compendium, supra note 60, ¶¶ 171–84. 
 80. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15. 
 81. Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 193 (providing that solidarity is “a moral requirement 
inherent within all human relationships”). 
 82. See Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15. 
 83. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 10, ¶ 40 ("[B]usiness management 
cannot concern itself only with the interests of the proprietors, but must also assume responsibility 
for all the other stakeholders who contribute to the life of the business: the workers, the clients, the 
suppliers of various elements of production, the community of reference."). 
 84. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15. 
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poor”85 has also been said to justify substantial “top down” intervention by 
the state.86 
The Church has defended the right to private property, but has, at the 
same time, emphasized the universal destination of all goods.  The state is 
entitled to—and should—intervene to protect the weak. It may—and 
should—act to “ensure wage levels adequate for the maintenance of the 
worker and his family”87 and to “block shameful forms of exploitation, 
especially to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable workers, of migrants, 
and those on the margins of society.”  The social encyclicals have long 
emphasized notions of distributive and social justice.  
C. THE INDETERMINANCY OF SUBSIDIARITY AND SOLIDARITY. 
Thus, may the irresistible force of subsidiarity seem to meet the 
irresistible force of solidarity. Solidarity recognizes “the social 
responsibility of humans” and a “rejection of individualism,”88 but 
subsidiarity calls for “the responsibility of people and intermediary 
communities.”89 Respecting the autonomy of lower orders—local 
governments or private associations, for example—may lead to some 
degree of inequality that is either thought to be unacceptable or greater than 
that which could be obtained (at least in theory) by state intervention. These 
positions are not contradictory, but they are at best, dialectical, and at worst, 
confounding. 
The operation of markets may undermine the efficacy of mediating 
structures and leave individuals unable—due to poverty or want of 
education—to fully exercise their own subjectivity. Decentralization can 
empower individuals and associations, but it may also simply leave the loss 
where it lies. It may result in the hegemony of institutions—for example, 
monopolists or the media or the socially dislocating operation of the 
 
 85. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 42. 
 86. See, e.g., National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral 
Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (Nov. 13, 1986), available at 
http://usccb.org/sdwp/international/EconomicJusticeforAll.pdf. 
 87. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15. 
 88. Vischer, supra note 6, at 110 (quoting J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in 
PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 133 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998)). But 
individualism ought not to be confused with individual liberty. The latter sees autonomy not as an 
end in itself, but as a necessary (i.e., not simply to be cast aside when it might not seem to be 
working) condition to a greater good. See Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 192 (“Solidarity 
highlights in a particular way the intrinsic social value of the human person, the equality of all in 
dignity and the rights and the common path of individuals and peoples towards an ever more 
common unity.”). 
 89. Vischer, supra note 6, at 110; see Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 185 (“It is impossible to 
promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for the family, groups, associations, 
local territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, cultural, sports-oriented, 
recreational, professional and political expressions to which people spontaneously give life and 
which make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth.”). 
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market—that undermines the freedom of individuals and usurps the role of 
intermediary institutions. 
But interventions to accomplish a greater degree of equality may 
impinge upon the prerogatives of individuals and lower orders. One cannot 
simply brush this off by saying that any intervention that is intended to lead 
to a “better” or more egalitarian result is reserved to a higher order without 
rendering subsidiarity meaningless.  
Pope John Paul II came closest to proposing an economic policy in 
Centesimus Annus: 
If by ‘capitalism’ is meant an economic system which recognizes 
the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private 
property and the resulting responsibility for the means of 
production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, 
then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would 
perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a ‘business economy’, 
‘market economy’ or simply ‘free economy’. But if by ‘capitalism’ 
is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not 
circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it 
at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as 
a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and 
religious, then the reply is certainly negative.90 
It would be difficult to find any mainstream political figure in the 
United States who would disagree. 
III. THE UNITY OF SUBSIDIARITY AND SOLIDARITY 
There is no way out of this bind, but perhaps we can find a way to 
mediate the inevitable conflict. It remains my contention that subsidiarity 
does provide an important heuristic by which to evaluate such proposals. 
Subsidiarity is, in my view, particularly useful in counteracting the 
particular temptations inherent in seeing crisis as opportunity or the natural 
tendency to see crises as more readily preventable than they are. It does so 
not merely by creating a rule or presumption of decentralization, but by 
making claims about both the instrumental and intrinsic value of the 
empowerment of individuals and the various associations and institutions 
into which they gather. 
It is not simply a judgment about what works, but about what is 
authentically human. If solidarity implies the value of every human life, 
then subsidiarity claims that each of us is, at least potentially, efficacious—
that is, we are not simply objects of assistance, but also subjects capable of 
transcending our present circumstance. Subsidiarity emphasizes the 
subjectivity of the human person as someone who is not only acted upon 
 
 90. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 42. 
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and served but as someone who acts and serves. Human freedom is 
extrinsically valuable because it allows for full development of the human 
person. 
Thus, in Populorum Progressio, Pope Paul VI noted that it is not 
enough to increase the general fund of wealth and distribute it more fairly: 
“Man is truly human only if he is the master of his own actions and the 
judge of their worth, only if he is the architect of his own progress. He must 
act accordingly to his God-given nature, freely accepting its potentials and 
its claims upon him.”91 
As noted earlier, Pope John Paul II has written that the social nature of 
man is not fulfilled in the state,92 but in the intermediary associations of 
which he is a part. It is by having “something he can call ‘his own’ and the 
possibility of earning a living through his own initiative” that he recognizes 
“his dignity as a person” and builds an “authentic human community.”93 
This initiative is “important not only for the individual, but also for the 
common good.”94 Only when it is free can development be “integrally 
human.”95 
Indeed, the Latin word “subsidium” means “support, assistance, aid, 
help, protection . . . .” 96 and the notion of subsidiarity seems to be more 
about the allocation of responsibility than checks and balances.97 The 
“service” to be provided, however, is not that of the lower orders fulfilling 
the objectives of those institutions higher in the chain of command, but of 
the higher ones. It is for them to offer assistance and not command.98 Thus, 
the underpinnings of subsidiarity are not simply jurisdictional and it is not 
right to view it simply as a protection against the concentration of power 
(even though it may serve that purpose). While one might say that the 
primary role the state plays in assuring solidarity is to provide a “juridical 
framework” for society and economy, and not take over their proper 
functions, the point is that there is intrinsic value in empowering the 
 
 91. Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio ¶ 34 (March 26, 1967), available at http://www. 
vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en. 
html.  
 92. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 13. 
 93. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 13. 
 94. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra  note 3, ¶ 14. 
 95. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 17. 
 96. See Charton T. Lewis & Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, available at http://www. 
perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=subsidium&la=la#lexicon. 
 97. Indeed subsidiarity is seen as “a form of assistance to the human person via the autonomy 
of intermediate bodies.” Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 57. 
 98. Gregory Beabout and Mary Catherine Hodes trace the word to the Roman “subsidium,” a 
group of military leaders that would sit behind those planning an operation in case extra support 
was needed. Gregory R. Beabout & Mary Catherine Hodes, John Paul II on the Relationship 
Between Civil Law and the Moral Law: Understanding Evangelium Vitae in Light of the Principle 
of Subsidiarity and the Moral Grammar of John Paul II, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 71, 87 (2007). 
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“lower” orders. Subsidiarity is not a matter of devolution because it does 
not involve the granting or delegation of powers from a higher power to a 
lower.  
This leads to my first claim. Subsidiarity is not simply instrumental. It 
makes a moral claim. It is not simply a statement about what will “work”—
that is, a claim that those closest to a problem will tend to reach the “best” 
solution. Nor is it merely a claim that devolution is necessary to check the 
inevitable abuse of centralized power. While neither of these observations 
are wrong, subsidiarity is a good in and of itself for it fully recognizes 
persons as subjects, rather than objects. Tracing the idea in the writings of 
John Paul II, Michael Novak writes: 
The underlying principle of the Polish Pope’s anthropology is the 
‘creative subjectivity’ of the human person, together with the 
resulting ‘subjectivity of society.’ From his earliest work on, 
including his phenomenological inquiry The Acting Person, the 
Pope had been struck by the human being’s most arresting 
characteristic: his or her capacity to originate action; that is, to 
imagine and to conceive of new things and then to do them. He 
found in creative acts the clue to human identity. Humans, he held, 
cannot take refuge from this responsibility by hiding behind 
‘society’—there, too, they are responsible for their acts. Being in 
society does not absolve them of the burdens of subjectivity.99 
Novak argues that “[i]t is an affront to human dignity for a social 
system to repress the human capacity to create, to invent and to be 
enterprising.”100 
This is most readily seen in the Church’s criticism of socialism. The 
problem is not simply that it failed to achieve social justice or to produce 
economic abundance (though it did fail on both accounts), but that it 
disregarded the subjectivity of its citizens, treating them as interchangeable 
cogs in social machinery or as objects of state beneficence. Socialism was 
based on a faulty anthropology. The denial of economic initiative 
“diminishes, or in practice absolutely destroys the spirit of initiative, that is 
to say, the creative subjectivity of the person.”101 This results not in true 
equality but a “leveling down” and “in the place of creative initiative, there 
appears passivity, dependence and submission . . . .”102  In doing so, it 
produced an enervated citizenry; men and women who were not fully able 
to realize their human potential. 
This suggests, it seems to me, that we ought to be concerned with not 
only the purpose of an intervention by a higher order, but also its (often 
 
 99. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 117. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 15. 
 102. Id. 
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unintended) impact. With Frederic Bastiat, we must acknowledge both the 
seen and unseen; what has happened and what has not.103 While a social 
safety net is imperative, perhaps we should be more concerned with 
empowerment than leveling. We ought to be wary of replacing opportunity 
with security. Indeed, recent encyclicals also criticize what they call the 
Social Assistance State. “By intervening and depriving society of its 
responsibility,” it “leads to a loss of human energy . . . .”104 The rationale 
for intervention is at its weakest when it is premised on a claim that a higher 
order can better accomplish what can be accomplished by a lower one or is 
in a better position to determine what is “right.”  
In Centesimus Annus, John Paul II told us that, in the production of 
wealth, “the decisive factor is increasingly man himself, that is, his 
knowledge, especially his scientific knowledge, his capacity for interrelated 
and compact organization, as well as his ability to perceive the needs of 
others and to satisfy them.”105 Policy cannot be evaluated without regard for 
its effect on human incentives and innovation. 
But there is more than that. Solidarity reminds us that this subjectivity 
is shared by all persons and, in Novak’s terms, all must have a real 
opportunity to “create, to invent and to be enterprising.” As John Courtney 
Murray wrote, even in a decentralized regime, the state may have a positive 
duty, not to create, but to “facilitate,” and that may justify intervention to 
aid—rather than to supplant—the functions of the lower orders.106 
Recognition that “one’s neighbor is the loving image of God” suggests, 
with solidarity, that policy cannot be evaluated without regard to its impact 
on the capacity to give as many opportunities as possible to participate. 
IV. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIAN REALISM 
If the road to hell is paved with good intentions,107 Christian Realism 
may help us to understand why. I define Realism as the recognition that, in 
our fallen world, there must be humility in human endeavors and a 
recognition that sin is intractable and can arise from even our best 
intentions. But Realism also cautions against retreat from the concerns of 
the world and abandonment of the demands of justice. Thus, like the yin 
and yang of subsidiarity and solidarity, it will rarely point to specific policy 
results or legal outcomes. It, too, is a perspective, rather than a prescription.  
 
 103. FREDERIC BASTIAT, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (Seymour Cain trans., Irvington-on-Hudson 1995) (1848). 
 104. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 48. 
 105. Id. ¶ 32. 
 106. See supra p. 383. 
 107. The origin of the phrase is most often attributed to Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–
1153), who wrote that “Hell is full of good intentions or desires.” See The Road to Hell is Paved 
With Good Intentions: Not Samuel Johnson!, http://www.samueljohnson.com/road.html (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
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Indeed, one of Reinhold Niebuhr’s most cited statements on the proper 
stance of the Christian in public life seems to point us in at least two 
directions: 
We have now come to the fairly general conclusion that there is no 
“Christian” economic or political system. But there is a Christian 
attitude toward all systems and schemes of justice. It consists on the 
one hand of a critical attitude toward the claims of all systems and 
schemes, expressed in the question whether they will contribute to 
justice in a concrete situation; and on the other hand a responsible 
attitude, which will not pretend to be God nor refuse to make a 
decision between political answers to a problem because each 
answer is discovered to contain a moral ambiguity in God’s sight. 
We are men, not God; we are responsible for making choices 
between greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith, 
illuminating the human scene, makes it quite apparent that there is 
no pure good in history; and probably no pure evil, either. The fate 
of civilizations may depend on these choices.108 
We must choose with humility, understanding our limitations. But this 
“critical attitude” ought not to prevent us from choosing. We cannot be less 
than human. We cannot be God. 
We must, as prominent Niebuhr scholar Robin Lovin writes, “relate the 
biblical demand for justice to investigations into social facts, theories about 
the economy and society, and informed assessments of the probable results 
of alternative courses of action.”109 But, at the same time, realism cannot 
slip into defeatism: 
The naïve faith of the proletarian is the faith of the man of action. 
Rationality belongs to the cool observers. There is of course an 
element of illusion in the faith of the proletarian, as there is in all 
faith. But it is a necessary illusion, without which some truth is 
obscured. The inertia of society is so stubborn that no one will 
move against it, if he cannot believe that it can be more easily 
overcome than is actually the case. And no one will suffer the perils 
and pains involved in the process of radical social change, if he 
cannot believe in the possibility of a purer and fairer society than 
will ever be established.110 
Thus, Niebuhr posits a publicly-engaged Christian in a form of 
equipoise, presenting “[a]n adequate religion is always an ultimate 
optimism which has entertained all the facts that lead to pessimism.”111 
 
 108. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Theology and Political Thought in the Western World, in FAITH 
AND POLITICS 56 (Ronald H. Stone ed., 1968). 
 109. ROBIN W. LOVIN, REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND CHRISTIAN REALISM 102 (1995) . 
 110. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 221 (1932). 
 111. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS 182 (1940). 
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So, on the one hand, Christian Realism suggests a gimlet-eyed view of 
the facts. Although the social encyclicals have made clear that the moral 
law is superior to the economic law, this cannot be read as a warrant to 
ignore economic facts. Catholic social teaching also emphasizes truth. 
Without truth, Benedict XVI tells us, charity degenerates into 
sentimentality.112 There is a moral duty not only to seek justice, but also to 
learn and act in accordance with the facts on the ground. While there may 
be a right to minimum material substance, there may be no corresponding 
right to—or need for—“a universal agency empowered to guarantee it.”113 
Catholic Social Thought is not a warrant for the adoption of well-
intentioned but ineffectual policies. Father Sirico reminds us of the 
distinction between the “universality of faith and the universality of social 
organization.”114 
This too may have jurisdictional and even “conservative” implications. 
Economists tell us that centralized decision-making inevitably suffers from 
the inability of one decision maker to have enough knowledge to make 
superior decisions.115 The argument is, in part, that those who are “closer” 
to a situation will have “better” knowledge of pertinent facts and interests. 
But it is also a claim about the limits of human knowledge. No one person 
or institution can ever know “enough” to impose a solution and better 
outcomes flow the bottom up,  that is, from the collection of independent 
decisions made by a variety of individuals and institutions. Political 
theorists tell us that public processes are likely to be captured by the 
especially interested. Consultation with and cooperation among 
“stakeholders” is as likely to lead collectively bargained rent seeking as is 
to promotion of the common good.116 
This may impact the oft-cited claim that the “moral law” somehow 
“trumps” the economic law. Taken alone, this is certainly true. But the 
moral law cannot truly be formed without consideration of the economic 
law. However we might see the moral value in a just wage, we cannot wish 
away the consequences of a legislative mandate that conditions the creation 
of a job upon its payment. While we can recognize the potential value of 
labor unions as intermediary associations, this does not excuse us from a 
clear-eyed appraisal of their economic impact on employment and prices. 
To do otherwise would be an abdication of moral responsibility. Without a 
 
 112. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 3. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Sirico, supra note 72, at 555. 
 115. Michael Novak, for example, criticized Quadragesimo Anno’s call for a “directing 
principle” in economic life on the grounds that such principle may not be directed toward 
furthering the common good and, in any event, is unlikely to work as intended. Michael Novak, 
Liberty and Social Justice: Rescuing a Virtue, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER 269, 276 (Oliver F. Williams & John W. Houck eds., 1993). 
 116. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 141–44 (1965). 
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firm commitment to “the common good” (which must certainly include a 
commitment to be effective), solidarity is, in John Paul’s terms, nothing but 
a “vague feeling of compassion.”117 According to Benedict, “[d]eeds 
without knowledge are blind.”118 While one can find examples in the 
Church’s encyclicals that the “moral law” must trump the “economic law,” 
Realism would seem to remind us that the moral law cannot be formed 
without consideration of the economic law. 
Christian Realism reminds us of this as well. Recall that Niebuhr 
cautions not only against efforts to, in the words of Eric Voegelin, 
“immanentize the eschaton,”119 it also suggests that we not retreat in 
despair. We need to be “realistic” while also being aware that Christians 
must live in—and care for—the real world and real people. 
Professor Lovin warns against an idolatry of theory on the right as well 
as the left: 
When the practical lesson about restraint is raised to a principle, 
however, it becomes unrealistic. It substitutes the idea that 
government is at best the agency of last resort for the solution of 
society’s problems for a realistic evaluation of the possibilities and 
limitations of the state as a center of resources, to be deployed in 
specified ways for the solution of particular problems. A realism 
that tempers our tendency to assume that government can solve all 
our problems becomes instead the “too consistent” pessimism of 
Augustinian-Lutheran realism, which sees all forms of government 
as inherently limited by the need to bring under control forces of 
evil which cannot be dealt with according to the norms of Christian 
morality. 120 
He calls for a balanced realism that would stress “the indeterminacy of 
human vitalities in both their individual and their collective forms.”121  
There is much to appreciate in this. But subsidiarity, as we have seen, is 
about more than devolution and defense against abuse. It is a judgment, not 
only about what serves human flourishing, but also about what human 
flourishing is. If subsidiarity calls for devolution or for intervention by the 
state in subsidium, the purpose is to facilitate human creativity and 
initiative. It is to avoid what Tocqueville called the “soft despotism” of a 
state that, as Paul Rahe writes, “provides for our security, . . . foresees and 
supplies our needs, . . . guides us in our principal affairs, . . . directs our 
industry, . . . regulates our testaments, . . . divides our inheritances, and . . . 
covers the ‘surface’ of our society ‘with a network of petty regulations—
 
 117. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 38. 
 118. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 30. 
 119. ERIC VOEGLIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS 120 (1952). 
 120. LOVIN, supra note 109, at 187. 
 121. Id. 
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complicated, minute, and uniform.’” 122 Such a state, Tocqueville warned, is 
[g]enerally . . . gentle; almost never is it harsh. “It does not break 
wills; it softens them, bends them, and directs them.” Only on the 
rarest of occasions “does it force one to act, but it constantly 
opposes itself to one’s acting on one’s own; it does not destroy, it 
prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it gets in the 
way: it curtails, it enervates, it extinguishes, it stupefies.” And, step 
by step, relentlessly, with every passing day, as we gradually 
succumb to the spirit of irresponsibility and self-indulgence, this 
power grows in influence and scope, making us more and more like 
“a herd of timid and industrious animals, of which the government 
is the shepherd.”123 
John Paul echoed Tocqueville in warning against a paternalistic 
suppression of initiative that replaces “creative initiative” with “passivity, 
dependence and submission to the bureaucratic apparatus.”124 
V. HOW DOES IT MATTER? 
So where does this leave us? Determining when and where and how a 
higher order may intervene to “assist” a lower one is not an easy task. 
People of good faith can and will disagree about what will “work.” In fact, 
people of good faith can and do disagree about the impact of past policies. 
The Church does not propose to resolve this tension. As noted earlier, 
Popes have repeatedly emphasized that she has no models to propose.125 But 
it does suggest, I think, that neither the market nor the state offer 
redemption. In the present context, we should not lightly presume that the 
former can save us from the latter. 
President Obama claims the mantle of Realism. He says that Reinhold 
Niebuhr is his favorite philosopher and recognizes 
the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and 
hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our 
belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as 
an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take away . . . the sense we 
have to make these efforts knowing that they are hard, and not 
swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.126 
Once again, we have a statement that few would disagree with. But, at 
least to my ear, there is a certain (at least) rhetorical dissonance. In my 
view, a Niebuhrian Realist ought to at least pause in the face of claims that 
 
 122. RAHE, supra note 44, at 270. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 15. 
 125. See supra note 8. 
 126. David Brooks, Obama, Gospel and Verse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, http://select. 
nytimes.com/2007/04/26/opinion/26brooks.html?_r=1. 
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“Yes, we can” make “this the moment” when, as he told a congregation in 
South Carolina, “we can create a Kingdom right here on Earth.”127 While 
the President is certainly correct to say that we should be neither naïve nor 
bitter, I believe that the lesson to be taken from Realism is not simply that 
reform is “hard.” To the contrary, “making these efforts” may have—
indeed, is likely to have—unintended consequences, and there is a limit to 
what we can expect “these efforts” to accomplish. We must recognize that 
we act in a fallen world and human capacity often falls short of human 
aims. In Bastiat’s terms, the intervention of the state or “higher orders” has 
costs which are unseen. 
Of course, an admonition to be “careful” is, if useful, somewhat 
underdetermined. This is where Realism can now be aided by Catholic 
Social Thought. On the one hand, the centralization—and resulting 
restriction—of human creativity and of the scope of intermediary 
associations raises moral—as well as prudential—concerns. We must be 
concerned with the limitations of the power and the importance of 
jurisdictional questions. This is not because subsidiarity or any theological 
principle can be reduced to that, but because the empowerment of 
individuals and lower orders has intrinsic, as well as instrumental, value. 
We must focus on the nurturing of human agency and creativity. We ought 
to recognize that persons are subjects and not merely objects whose needs 
are a problem for others to solve. Their subjectivity and creativity must be 
respected and abetted. Efforts to “help” must be informed by the ways in 
which assistance might comprise interference and suppression.  
But, at the same time, we must understand that we are indeed to be men 
and women for others and that all persons possess a subjectivity and 
creativity that they ought to have a real—as opposed to theoretical—right to 
exercise. A critical attitude toward the administrative state ought to be 
combined with a critical attitude toward markets. We ought not to make an 
idol of the Ph.D. or the MBA.128 We should proceed with humility—not 
retreat in despair. 
To select an example, in evaluating proposals for and enactments of 
health care reform, a concern for the common good and acknowledgment of 
the imperative of solidarity suggests that we may not be indifferent to the 
availability of health care to all. While it may not be necessary to insure a 
complete equality in access to health care, it seems clear that some access to 
 
 127. Peter Hamby, Obama: GOP Doesn’t Own Faith Issue, CNN, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www. 
cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/08/obama.faith. 
 128. David Brooks, The Populist Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/01/26/opinion/26brooks.html (“Ever since I started covering politics, the Democratic 
ruling class has been driven by one fantasy: that voters will get so furious at people with M.B.A.’s 
that they will hand power to people with Ph.D.’s. The Republican ruling class has been driven by 
the fantasy that voters will get so furious at people with Ph.D.’s that they will hand power to 
people with M.B.A.’s.”). 
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a level of adequate care ought to be a policy imperative. Solidarity suggests 
that we cannot be indifferent to the inability of others to obtain adequate 
care. 
But this does not mean that individuals have no obligation to contribute 
to the cost of his or her care. To say otherwise would be to deny human 
agency and responsibility. Recognition of this might imply that the failure 
to assume this responsibility will have consequences. It would be wrong to 
too readily assume that individuals are incapable of providing for and 
taking control of their care. 
This will only get us so far, perhaps ruling out approaches that are 
entirely laissez-faire or completely statist. But there is more. We should 
also be concerned about the manner in which reform might impact medical 
innovation. The recognition of human agency and creativity warns against 
ever assuming that the present state of affairs is static. We ought never to 
assume that creativity and innovation are givens unaffected by public 
policy. We should be careful about assuming that innovation and creativity 
can be centrally directed. Centralization necessarily limits creativity from 
the bottom (or at least outside the favored agency) and creates concerns 
about the dangers of placing too much power in a small number of hands. 
Perhaps we can go a bit further. As noted above, subsidiarity is not a 
mere matter of jurisdiction. Soldiarity, while not imbuing the state with the 
authority to (try to) create a perfect world, cautions against a doctrinaire 
individualism. But recognition of the ways in which an overly ambitious 
centralization of authority and standardization of policy cannot only enable 
abuse but stifle creativity may have implications for talk about federalism 
and structural limits on the authority of the state—both for health care 
policy and beyond. . Consider the matter of federalism and structural 
limitations on the authority of the state.  
Nevertheless, some have seen subsidiarity as a warrant for a more 
robust federalism or more substantial limitations on federal authority.129 
These writers have tended to emphasize that aspect of subsidiarity which 
mirrors Realism’s skepticism about human capacities and see subsidiarity 
as a protection against the dangers inherent in centralized authority 
structures.  
But there is also a sense in which recognition of these limitations might 
have an intrinsic as well as an instrumental value. Although not writing 
about subsidiarity but Tocqueville’s notion of “associationalism,” John 
McGinnis130 sees the Rehnquist Court’s strengthening of the principles of 
 
 129. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
795, 833 (1996); Douglas W. Kmiec, Liberty Misconceived: Hayek’s Incomplete Relationship 
Between Natural and Customary Law, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 209, 215 (1995). 
 130. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
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federalism131, freedom of association132, and the creation of additional 
constitutional space for the expression of competing religiously based 
norms133 as the creation of “discovery machines” for the generation of 
competing values.134 The idea is not simply that power will be abused or 
that no single authority can be expected to get things right, but that broad 
participation is, in and of itself, a good thing. The view of subsidiarity 
advanced here may suggest that certain constitutional provisions—the 
Tenth Amendment135, the Commerce power136, or the Necessary and 
Proper137 clause―are not simply a bulwark against abuse or overly 
ambitious power, but a facilitation of empowerment of human agency – not 
simply when exercised by the government, but individually and throughout 
civil society.138 
If that is so, we may wish to see these constitutional provisions not as 
demarcation of predetermined spheres of authority but as tools for the 
assessment of claims for federal power. The inquiry would not be whether 
there is, say, a plausible connection between a congressional enactment and 
interstate commerce,139 but whether facilitation of interstate commerce—in 
 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“Violence Against Women 
Act” exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause power.) 
 132.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding ability of 
private association to exclude from leadership those who it believes undermine its associational 
purpose); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (associational rights of 
political parties); Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217 (2000) (upholding constitutionality of viewpoint neutral government support for civil 
associations).  
 133. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 
(1995). 
 134. McGinnis, supra note 130, at 490–91. 
 135. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 136. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 137. “The Congress shall have Power - To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 138. In a recent book, Erwin Chemerinsky sees federalism not as a limitation on the power of 
the federal government but a grant of power to many levels of government. ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT (2008). It means that the federal government may act 
when the states have not and, with some limitations, the state may act when the federal 
government has not. The idea is not to restrict the authority of any level of government to in 
deference to the authority of lower levels of government, civil society or individuals, but to 
empower multiple public agencies. Whatever the merits of this idea, it has little in common with 
the notion of subsidiarity discussed here. 
 139. An extreme “but for a nail” view of the Commerce Clause, for example, seems to have 
been rejected by the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the Court 
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which individuals and intermediary associations engage—requires the 
enacted intervention. Perhaps even a connection between regulation of local 
and “noncommercial” or “noneconomic” activity and a regulatory scheme 
might not be sufficient to warrant federal regulation if it unduly interferes 
with the decisions of individuals or “lower” orders. Justice Kennedy, for 
example, has expressed concern about using the Commerce power to 
“foreclose the States from experimenting and exercising their own 
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and 
expertise . . . by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the 
ordinary and usual sense of that term.”140 
This may require some rethinking of current doctrine and discourse. 
The Court’s modern jurisprudence on the demarcation of Congressional 
authority, at least in the modern era, seems relatively unconcerned with 
defining limits based upon the role and capacity of various units of 
government and intermediary institutions.141 Indeed, one might argue that 
post-New Deal jurisprudence on the structural limits of federal power has 
become desultorily formalist. If we can imagine a way in which an 
activity—perhaps commercial, but perhaps not, if engaged in by a 
sufficiently large number of people, may affect commerce (broadly defined) 
among the states (also broadly defined), then the commerce power is, at 
least presumptively, properly exercised without regard to much further 
analysis as to whether it makes sense for a centralized determination of the 
policy questions in hand.142 There appear—or so some say—little justiciable 
limitations of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper and 
General Welfare clauses.143 
Beyond this, in assessing the “individual mandate” of the health care 
bill144, some have argued  that the legislation does something largely 
unprecedented, i.e., it mandates that every citizen of the United States, 
whether engaged in commercial activity or not, buy a product—the nature 
 
upheld regulation of local—and arguably noncommercial—activity as necessary to serve a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
 140. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 141. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 
(2006) (seeking to reopen debate over whether the Constitution protects economic liberties and 
confers only limited authority on Congress under the Commerce Clause); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 1 (2004) (“Since the adoption of the Constitution, courts 
have eliminated clause after clause that interfered with the exercise of government power.”). But 
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 1 (criticizing a view of federalism as a limitation of 
governmental power that the author argues has been “very much followed by the Supreme Court 
over the past ten years”) 
 142. See, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 143. See infra text accompanying note 155. 
 144. The bill requires all persons who are not insured through their employer or a public 
program to purchase insurance. Failure to do so will result in the imposition of a fine to be added 
to the noncompliant individual’s income tax liability. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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of which will be defined by federal fiat—or face a financial penalty.145 
Supporters of the legislation have argued either the mandate is within the 
Commerce power because health care is an interstate market and mandating 
the participation of young and healthy persons is necessary to reduce the 
cost to those who are older and less healthy.146 Further, the failure of these 
individuals to insure will create demands on the public fisc (they will not be 
allowed to go without care) and interfere with the state’s regulatory 
scheme.147 This is a rather aggressive reading of the Commerce authority—
coming perilously close (although perhaps not quite) to a claim that a 
person can be regulated because his or her mere existence (or the way in 
which the government might respond to it) will affect interstate commerce. 
An even more expansive theory justifies the individual mandate 
because if the fine is collected it is collected as a “tax” and, when it comes 
to tax, anything goes. 148 To accept such a theory would be to largely 
abandon the notion of structural limits on Congressional authority. 
Some celebrate this. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, for example, 
see the Court’s federalism jurisprudence as “incoherent” because it serves a 
set of concerns (division along geographic and state lines) that no longer 
exists and that has been superseded by the demands of the modern 
administrative state, an entity that is presumed necessary to rationalize 
economic and social relationships.149  This seems entirely consistent with 
the Obama administration as a “Policy” presidency. 
To be sure, unlike the constitution of the European Union in which it is 
expressly mentioned150, subsidiarity is not itself a constitutional principle in 
the United States. It is nowhere to be found in the constitutional text and, at 
least as formulated and expounded by the Catholic Church, could not have 
been known to the Founders. Nevertheless, federalism and separation of 
powers are evocative of subsidiarity (at least in its jurisdictional sense) and 
Founding era document warning of the dangers of the usurpation of power 
by higher orders151 and the wisdom of the decentralization and division of 
 
 145. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Jack M. Bakin, A Healthy Debate: The 
Consitutitonality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 93, 99 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf (“Whether such a requirement would 
be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question posed by 
such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an 
individual to purchase a good or service.”). 
 146. Id. at 94–95. 
 147. Id. at 106–08. 
 148. Id. at 102–05. 
 149. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY AND EDWARD R. RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY 
AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008). 
 150. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 8. 
 151. Professor McGinnis cites James Wilson’s admonition, stating that “James Wilson warned 
against sacrificing the primacy of civil society on the ‘idol of government.’” McGinnis, supra note 
130, at 490. 
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power152 are not hard to find.153   
Stephen Gardbaum, for example, has argued that certain decisions of 
the Rehnquist Court suggest that, rather than seeing structural limitations as 
merely a matter of what authority Congress has been denied, there are areas 
of concurrent authority between Congress and states in which the power to 
preempt state action is not unlimited but subject to a burden of proof that 
Congressional jurisdiction is superior.154  He argues that the Necessary and 
Proper clause might be interpreted to requires that an exercise of 
Congressional jurisdiction in an area that is concurrently within the 
authority of the states, “the capabilities and interests of the states are 
genuinely considered and reasonably outweighed”—a requirement 
“strikingly similar” to the notion of subsidiarity as embodied in the 
Mastricht Treaty.155 As noted above, John McGinnis argues that the 
Rehnquist Court ushered in a “Tocqueville jurisprudence” characterized by 
a recognition that devolution of authority generates human creativity and 
the generation of alternative values.156 It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
analyze, for example, whether the health care bill’s individual mandate is 
constitutionally permissible. My suggestion here is that, to the extent that 
constitutional text and history is indeterminate, the insights of subsidiarity, 
solidarity, and Realism may help us organize our thoughts.  
But this hardly ends controversy over the proper role and scope of 
federal authority or government in general. Robert Vischer has attempted to 
use subsidiarity to argue for increased federal involvement in four areas of 
policy.157 He argued that the protection of intermediary institutions might be 
aided by more aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws and greater legal 
protection for collective bargaining. He saw regulation of campaign finance 
as a way to counter the potential for wealth to crowd out political 
participation by those who are not wealthy, and federal environmental 
regulation as a way to correct an obstacle to state regulation of the 
environment—that is, the tendency of competition for jobs to create a “race 
to the bottom.” 
Professor Vischer offers reasonable arguments in support of each of 
these propositions, although none is clearly correct under the lens provided 
 
 152. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (“[T]he society itself will be broken 
into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the 
minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”) 
 153. See Vischer, supra note 6, at 123 (“From executive orders requiring that a proposed 
federal action be weighed against the efficacy of state action, to congressional restraint in areas of 
state regulatory competence, to judicial enforcement of state-federal boundaries, much of this 
country’s political and legal landscape comports fully with subsidiarity’s ideal.”). 
 154. Gardbaum, supra note 129, at 796–98. 
 155. Id. at 835–36. 
 156. McGinnis, supra  note 130. 
 157. Vischer, supra note 6, at 127–42. 
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by the notions of subsidiarity and solidarity aided by the insights of 
Christian Realism. To the extent that the application of antitrust law 
involves management of competition by the judicially mediated “expertise 
of economists,” both subsidiarity and Christian Realism might cause us to 
pause and consider the plausibility that such a thing can be done. While 
collective bargaining might certainly empower labor, it can also create rigid 
and ossified structures that stifle innovation and exclude economic 
participation by the unorganized or less productive members of society. 
Campaign finance reform can be a form of incumbent protection, and 
environmental regulation also, by its nature, generally requires the 
centralized management of highly complex market systems. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE PRIMACY OF PARADOX 
In the end, the value of our theological insights might be to make us 
uncomfortable in our ideological cocoons. Life is paradoxical and so is 
public policy. While solidarity calls us to seek the common good of all, 
subsidiarity reminds us that the common good consists not only of the 
provision of material goods and license for individuals in those matters seen 
as private, but also of the exercise of authentic human creativity and 
responsibility. While subsidiarity may create a preference for 
decentralization and devolution, solidarity reminds us that we cannot be 
indifferent to the lack of opportunity for all to exercise that responsibility 
and creativity. Christian Realism reminds us of our limitations and the 
moral call to be effective as well as empathic. It cautions that we think 
about Bastiat’s “unseen things.” At the same time, it also warns us not to 
become paralyzed by pessimism and uncertainty.  
Recalling these paradoxes will not make us agree on the issues that 
divide us. But it may help us talk about them. 
 
